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THE NEW EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP: ANALYZING THE
PROCESS OF PROOF
RICHARD LEMPERT*

I.

EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP: FROM RULES TO PROOF

When I began teaching evidence seventeen years ago, the field was
moribund. The great systematizers of the common law-Wigmore, Maguire,
McCormick, Morgan and their ilk-had come and, if they had not all already
gone, their work was largely finished. Not only was most of what passed for
evidence scholarship barely worth the reading-the same, after all, could be
said of many fields of law at most times-but disregarding student work, few
scholars were writing regularly on evidentiary matters.
This situation changed with the proposal and adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. New talent was attracted to the field of evidence and lead
articles on evidence proliferated in the law reviews. Too often, however,
these articles followed the model "What's Wrong with the Twenty-Ninth
Exception to the Hearsay Rule and How the Addition of Three Words Can
Correct the Problem." 1 They were seldom interesting and if they had potential utility it was rarely realized, for the federal rules remain today largely as
they were when enacted. 2 The work was, in short, a timid kind of deconstructionism with no overarching critical theory to give it life. But the
interest in evidence inspired by the federal rules, even if rarely revealed in
memorable work on that topic, was all to the good. Genuinely talented
people have become excited about exploring evidentiary issues.
Today I think we are seeing the fruits of this burgeoning of interest and the
talent it has attracted. Evidence is being transformed from a field concerned
with the articulation of rules to a field concerned with the process of proof.
Wigmore's other great work is being rediscovered, 3 and disciplines outside
t © 1986 by Richard Lempert.
* Professor of Law & Sociology, University of Michigan Law School. J.D. 1968
University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D. 1971 University of Michigan. I am
grateful to the following people for reading and commenting on a draft version of this
paper: Stephen Burbank, Stephen Fienberg, David Kaye, Donald Regan, David
Schum, Peter Tillers and Judith Thomson. The usual disclaimers of commentor
responsibility apply; in some instances with more than the usual degree of force.
1 This title not only suggests the focus of the type of scholarship I am thinking
about but also typifies it in length and lack of grace.
2 Some of this work may have influenced state codifications or judicial constructions of ambiguous language. Such an impact-if it occurred-is a genuine contribution that I do not denigrate. It reminds us that scholarship may be valuable without
being interesting.
3 J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOL-
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the law, like mathematics, psychology and philosophy, are being plumbed
for the guidance they can give. 4
This symposium is a testimony to this third wave (in my teaching lifetime)
of evidence scholarship; indeed, nowhere is the concern for proof more
central than in that body of scholarship which seeks to build on or criticize
mathematical models as modes of proof or as a means of understanding trial
processes. What I propose to do in this paper is, first, discuss briefly the
ends to which this body of work is directed. Then, I shall develop some
themes, stimulated by a portion of Professor Allen's paper and by the larger
literature, including other papers prepared for this symposium, of which it is
a part. Finally, since this paper originated in an invitation to comment on
Professor Allen's contribution to the symposium, I shall examine closely
Professor Allen's suggestion that rather than rethink our mathematics we
should reconceptualize trials.
II.

THE USE OF MODELS

The literature that relates theories of probability to theories of proof is
largely a debate between those who advocate some role for Bayesian modes
of inference in understanding or applying the law and those who criticize or
reject this position. 5 The language of the debate is often mathematics or
essentially mathematical metaphors, but in this case the abstraction of
numbers does not preclude considerable passion. The passion suggests that
something important is at stake. In fact, there are a variety of stakes, and
OGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE, AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (3d ed.

1937).
4 I realize that broad-brush painting of the kind I have done thus far calls out for
detailed support by citation in the law review tradition. However, as an invited
commentator in a symposium, I think the essayist tradition which does not demand
detailed footnoting of what most people know is not out of place and has much to
commend it. Citation to the works of the great common law critics and synthesizers is
unnecessary for anyone who knows anything about evidence, and I would not cite

authors of "Twenty-Ninth Exception" type articles in any event, for there is no
virtue in embarrassing people or in creating unnecessary enemies. I shall discuss a
major body of "process and proof" type work in what follows. Among the work I
could cite under this head let me simply note the work on presumptions by Ronald
Allen, see, e.g., Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A
Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321
(1980), and Charles Nesson, see, e.g., Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1979), to emphasize

that transforming the focus of evidence scholarship from rules to proof does not
exclude familiar modes of doctrinal legal scholarship.
5 Frequentists-the Bayesians' usual antagonists in discussions of the utility of the
Bayesian approach to statistics-are generally non-participants in the discussion. But
see Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect
Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1986).
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what is in issue has important implications for the conflicting positions. Too
often, however, the stakes are not sorted out, and our ability to assess the
relative merits of Bayesian and other approaches to the problem of proof
suffers as a result. Thus, our first step is to ask why a particular conceptualization of the proof process is being used or advocated. As Professors
Schum6 and Tillers7 have suggested in the papers they prepared for this
symposium, some conceptualizations will be better suited for certain purposes than others.
A.

A Prescriptionfor Action

The article which triggered widespread interest in the applicability of
Bayesian reasoning to trial processes-and arguably still accounts for residual passion-was the comment of Finklestein and Fairley on People v.
Collins ,' in which they argued that the real problem in that case lay not in the
prosecutor's attempt to use statistical reasoning but in his failure to offer the
jury statistical information in the form best suited to its decision-making
task-i.e., Bayes's Theorem.9 Professor Laurence Tribe, in his justly cele6 Schum, Discovery, Proof, and Probability:Is the Current Probability Debate
Necessary?, 66 B.U.L. REV. 825 (1986).
7 Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U.L. REV. 883 (1986).
8 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (en banc).
9 Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970). This was not the first article in the legal literature to
suggest the applicability of Bayes's Theorem to trial proof. See Cullison, Probability
Analysis of JudicialFact-Finding:A PreliminaryOutline of the Subjective Approach,
1 TOL. L. REV. 538 (1969); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968). See also Ball, Moment of Truth: ProbabilityTheory and
Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961). However, these earlier discussions did not benefit from either the interest in probability theory engendered by
People v. Collins or from making claims so bold and questionable as to arouse the
interest of an antagonist as formidable as Laurence Tribe.
There is another more autobiographical sense in which the Finklestein and Fairley
article together with Tribe's response helped generate some of the debate that
followed. In the winter of 1972 1 taught a seminar on problems in trials and proof to
five students at the Yale Law School. We spent several weeks on the Bayesian
debate, teaching ourselves Bayes's Theorem largely from the footnotes to the two
articles. One conclusion we reached was that while Tribe had won the debate on the
advisability of instructing jurors in Bayes's Theorem, the theorem had substantial
potential as a model of legal standards and processes of proof. Half the members of
that seminar-if I may consider myself a member-went on to publish articles
reflecting this belief. Daniel Kornstein authored an article entitled A Bayesian Model
of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976), and I wrote Modeling Relevance,
75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977). By far the most important member of this group was
David Kaye, whose numerous contributions figure prominently in discussions of
Bayes's Theorem, statistics, and trial processes, as can be seen from the many
citations to his work in this symposium issue.
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brated article Trial by Mathematics,1O took issue with Finklestein and

Fairley on both counts.
Among legal academics it is generally agreed that Tribe won this particular
debate. As Professor Allen writes in his contribution to this symposium, "It
is becoming increasingly obvious, for example, that Bayesian approaches
can best be used heuristically as guides to rational thought and not as specific
blueprints for forensic decisionmaking." 11 This conclusion, is however,
premature. 12 Statistical evidence has figured in litigation for more than a
century,"3 and in recent years has become increasingly common and complex.' 4 For example, a recent LEXIS search of statistical terms done for the
National Research Council reports:
A search of published opinions in federal courts with a computer-based
legal information retrieval system reveals the dramatic growth since
1960 in cases involving some form of statistical evidence. Between
January 1960 and September 1979 the terms 'statistic(s)' or 'statistical'
appeared in about 3,000 or 4% of 83,769 reported District Court opinions. In the Courts of Appeals, the same terms appeared in 1,671
reported opinions.15
These uses include not only statistical descriptions of samples and populations, but also uses of the kind Finklestein and Fairley proposed-as identification evidence. 1 6 With both sorts of uses problems arise because juries
are presented with frequentist statistics in situations where Bayesian approaches may be more appropriate to the task at hand. 7
I shall not dwell on this issue except to make one point. Many participants
10Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).

1 Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L. REV. 401, 402 (1986)
(citing Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian
Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1 (1982)).
"2 It is, I should note, a view I once shared. See Lempert, supra note 9,at
1021.
13 See, e.g., Meier & Zabell, Benjamin Peirce and the Howland Will, 75 J. AM.
STATISTICAL A., 497-506 (1980) (discussing Robinson v. Mandell, 20 Fed. Cas.

1027 (C.C.D. Mass. 1868)).
14 See, e.g., Fienberg, The Increasing Sophistication of Statistical Assessments as
Evidence in Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 784 (1982).
15 THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS
COURTS

AS EVIDENCE IN THE

11 (S. Fienberg ed. 1986) (Draft report of the Panel on Statistical Assess-

ments as Evidence, National Research Council).
1 Examples include efforts to identify the accused as the criminal through blood
traces or hair samples. (The statistical basis of hair sample identifications is, I should
note, suspect. See id. at 79-82.) Other kinds of identification evidence like fingerprints also depend on statistical inferences but the reliability of these tests is thought
to be so high that their statistical base may be neglected.
1' Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L.
1098 (1985); see supra note 15 and accompanying text.

REV.
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in this symposium paint with a broad brush in rejecting any place for
Bayesian models in trial processes.'" Often their arguments, or portions of
their arguments, read as if statistical evidence has no place at all in trials.
Those who criticize Bayesian models of the legal process and the suggested
application of Bayesian approaches at trial must confront the reality that
statistical evidence is offered in trials every day.
I do not mean to argue that this reality cannot be accommodated by critics
of Bayesian models or proposed applications. It is not difficult to imagine a
place for statistical evidence in a theory that focuses, as do most nonBayesian theories of rational proof, on the relative weight of conflicting
evidence, the plausible generalizations that trial evidence allows, or the
coherence of evidence with some larger plausible story. More difficult challenges for those who reject the Bayesian perspective are to explain why, if
statistical evidence is presented at trials, frequentist approaches should be
preferred to Bayesian ones, 19 and to reevaluate arguments used to reject
Bayesian approaches to proof where they do not accommodate the reality of
the regular use of statistical evidence. Thus, arguments from the intuition
that the law will not allow verdicts to rest on naked statistical evidence must
accommodate or condemn a world in which the only admissible evidence of
discrimination is embodied in a statistical model, or where the only admissible evidence linking the defendant to a crime is a hair match."0 If the answer
is, as it appears implicitly to be in the case of fingerprint evidence, that the
statistical probabilities are sufficiently high as to be unproblematic, an explanation is required of why one level of irreducible and undeniable uncertainty is tolerable and another is not.
B.

Normative Models

A second use that may be made of Bayes's Theorem and of competing
probabilistic schemes is as a normative model. This use is not completely
18 See,

e.g., Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review, Quantitative Methods and Legal
REV. 116 (1978); L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE

Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L.
PROVABLE passim (1977).

18Even this may not be essential for those who reject Bayesian models of the proof
process. Some role for a Bayesian presentation of evidence may be nested within a
more encompassing non-bayesian theory.
,0 Ordinarily the latter type of evidence will not be naked because some of the
evidence that led, for example, to the decision to take a hair sample from the suspect
will be admissible. But such statistical evidence may be naked when the evidence
that leads to the suspect's arrest is not admissible or when, as in the case of
fingerprints, "trace" evidence, the weight of which can only be evaluated statistically, is all that allows the suspect to be identified. Moreover, even where the
statistical evidence is not naked, it may so far outweigh all other evidence in the case
that it is clearly both crucial and dispositive. Where this is clear, one must confront
the fact that the trier is relying on statistical evidence despite the irreducible and
undeniable uncertainty that such evidence entails, thus posing the core problem of
naked statistical evidence.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 439

distinct from the first use I have discussed, as those who advocate instructing factfinders on Bayes's Theorem do so on the assumption that Bayesian
reasoning is normatively appropriate for legal factfinding. Attacks on
Bayes's Theorem as a normative model may be similarly motivated by the
perception of a link between the status of Bayes's Theorem as a normative
model for trial factfinding and the appropriateness of furnishing jurors with
the information needed to reason in a Bayesian fashion. In part to preclude
any movement in the latter direction, critics of "trials by mathematics"
deny the possibility that Bayes's Theorem may be a normative model of how
trial factfinders should proceed.
The practical consequence of promoting Bayesian approaches at trials
does not, however, follow from accepting Bayes's Theorem as a normative
model for adjudicative factfinding. First, there may be competing norms.
Bayes's Theorem may model only part of the reaction we expect jurors to
have to information, and emphasizing the Bayesian part may have adverse
consequences for other values. The right of juries to nullify, for example,
suggests that jury factfinding is valued for reasons that extend beyond the
rational weighing of evidence. Encouraging jurors to be more Bayesian may
cause them to emphasize the rational, evidence-weighing aspect of their task
to the detriment of other aspects we wish to preserve. Going further and
providing jurors with aids to Bayesian information processing (imagine
jurors of the future punching into a computer their prior probabilities and
likelihood ratios after each item of evidence) or even failing to provide jurors
with more than statistical evidence may symbolically-and intolerablydenigrate messages we wish to convey about trials or human judgment.
A second reason why Bayesian normativity does not necessarily suggest
the desirability of changing current modes of proof is that it may be impossible to provide jurors with the information they need to process information
in a Bayesian rational fashion. In particular, we may not be able to inform
jurors adequately concerning those prior probabilities that provide the basis
for assimilating new information, or about the degree of dependency among
various items of evidence. The move usually made by Bayesian advocates to
deal with this problem-to allow subjective estimates of these hard (perhaps
impossible) to quantify values-is not necessarily sound, for obvious
"second-best" problems are raised. Strictly Bayesian decisions with inaccurate priors or mistaken estimates of evidentiary dependency may lead to
worse decisions, by the criteria of full-information Bayesian rationality, than
the decisions jurors would reach through ordinary unsystematic and nonmathematical processes. 22
1 Cf. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProofand the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1375 (1985).
22 In this connection it is important to note that a juror's information processing is
not in an important sense fully personalistic. Thus, in deciding how to instruct the
jury we do not function, for example, as decision theorists trying to aid a client with

NEW EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP

1986]

A different second-best problem arises if, as is clearly the case, people are
not natural Bayesian decisionmakers.2 3 While a factfinder's entire
decision-making process might be more rational in the sense of yielding, on
the average, more accurate verdicts if the entire case could be presented

an investment decision. The theorist can tell the client that if he estimates probabilities in a particular way, a certain decision is a wise one. Since the client is
deciding for himself, it is appropriate for him to live with his estimates; he can hardly
be heard to complain that he would have done better had he followed an apparently
less rational way of combining information because his probability estimates were
not accurate. Given what he believed at the time, his action was the best thing for him
to do. A juror, however, is deciding for someone else and society must live with the
juror's errors. Thus the juror's probability estimates may be subjective but they are
not personal in the sense that the resulting decision is the best thing for him to do.
The law is not interested in what is most satisfying or wisest for the juror, but only in
accurate verdicts, leavened perhaps by other value considerations. While it may be
appropriate to hold individuals deciding for themselves to the perverse consequences
that sometimes attend second-best solutions, the law in deciding whether a particular
kind of reasoning should be promoted cannot escape the need to evaluate fully the
consequences of introducing an irreducibly subjective element.
A committed Bayesian subjectivist might argue that there is no such thing as an
objective probability or that objective probabilities exist only in those limited circumstances where a known mechanism randomly generates outcomes from a larger set. It
is clear, however, that for some purposes some probability estimates are better than
others. A person who bets on outcomes of tosses of a fair coin will, for example, lose
money if he gives odds based on the prior expectation that the coin has a 2/3 chance
of coming up heads. Indeed, I would argue that working from a "realistic" prior,
whether held initially or derived retrospectively by induction, is in law and most
other settings an important ingredient of rational thought. For example, a juror who
believes at the outset of litigation that the odds are 100:1 that a tort plaintiff injured
himself through his own negligence would not be deciding the subsequent case
rationally within the meaning of the law even if he used a perfectly Bayesian
approach to evaluate all further items of evidence. The factfinder would from the
law's standpoint be similarly irrational if in applying Bayes's Theorem the evidentiary value accorded the information entering the likelihood ratio were untenable.
Rationality in law, I am arguing, involves a "sensible" view of the weight to be
accorded information and not just the process of combining subjectively weighted
evidence according to a scheme that meets the criteria of some normative modellike Bayes's Theorem--of rational decisionmaking. When I speak of a "realistic"
view of a prior probability or a "sensible" view of the weight to be accorded
information, I mean a view which, if information is rationally combined, will lead to a
verdict that given the evidence presented is likely (i.e., is a good bet) to describe the
situation the factfinder is charged with reconstructing.
23 Schum & Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in
Jurisprudence, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105 (1982). See also D. KAHNEMAN, P.

SLOVIC

& A.

(1982); R.

TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
& L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOM-

NISIBETT

INGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT

(1980).
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statistically with accurate probabilities amenable to Bayesian manipulation,
it does not necessarily follow that verdicts on the average will be more
accurate if only portions of cases are so presented. Professor Tribe,2 4 in his
critique of trials by mathematics, advanced one important reason why this is
so when he suggested that numerical information might dwarf "softer" data.
To this observation one might add that Bayesian ways of presenting information might have a greater impact than the ways that information is presented
for softer information processing. In each case, of course, the softer data or
the data better suited for softer processing may be more informative (diagnostic) than the information that exists or can be presented in a more
systematic and quantitative form.
The argument about the "hard" dwarfing the "soft" might apply even if
legal factfinders were natural Bayesian reasoners, for they might attend to
information based on its compatibility with their natural mode of reasoning.
If factfinders aren't natural Bayesian reasoners further problems can arise
when attempts are made to encourage them to think about all or part of a
case in Bayesian terms. Factfinders might be confused in ways they would
not be if they received no advice about how to combine evidence, or they
might give the quantitative evidence too little rather than too much weight
because the Bayesian decision-making style was unfamiliar or felt onerous.
The net result might be less accurate verdicts than the system would produce
if all evidence were qualitative and no word of Bayes's Theorem were
breathed.
For these reasons at least, the debate about whether Bayes's Theorem is
an accurate normative model for all or part of the trial process has no
necessary implications for the way we choose to conduct trials. But these
potential problems do not mean that it is a mistake to instruct juries or judges
about Bayesian reasoning or to introduce more quantitative methods at
trials. It is an empirical question whether the problems I discuss above are
so serious that, even if Bayes's Theorem is an appropriate normative model
for all or part of the trial process, no attempt should be made to make legal
factfinders better Bayesian reasoners. 25 Let us assume, however, that the
problems I point to preclude practical applications of the Bayesian perspective at trial. Of what use, then, is Bayes's Theorem and why does the
normativity of the Bayesian approach matter? I will suggest two reasons.
First, Bayes's Theorem may be useful as a heuristic device. This is the use
26
I made of it in my article Modeling Relevance. While I am clearly the
Tribe, supra note 10.
By the same token, Bayes's Theorem may be an inappropriate normative model
for trials but it may be appropriate to instruct jurors in Bayesian approaches to
information processing. The case may be particularly strong where the issue is not
whether jurors are going to be given statistical evidence, but how that evidence is to
be presented. See supra notes 13-20.
26 Lempert, supra note 9.
24

25
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wrong person to offer unbiased testimony, I use Bayes's Theorem every
year when I teach relevance in my evidence course, and it works. Students
have a better understanding of issues relating to relevance than they had
before I used this approach, and the class develops a common vocabulary
with which to discuss relevance-related problems throughout the course.17 I
also continue to defend the propositions that the basic rules of relevance,
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402,8 are captured, as a normative
matter, by Bayes's Theorem, and that the question whether probative value
is outweighed by such Rule 403 considerations as prejudice and waste of
time may be illuminated in a Bayesian framework." a
This use of Bayes's Theorem treats the law's rules and procedures as
normative and attempts to model them. One might also argue that rationality
of the type represented by Bayes's Theorem should characterize legal
factfinding and that if the law's norms do not conform to the requisites of
Bayesian models of rationality they should be changed so that they do. This
is in essence the move that Professor Allen makes when he argues that we
should respond to the law's shortcomings vis-h-vis normative models of
rationality by changing the way we think about trials. The boldness of this
move is self-evident, and Professor Allen's attempt to ground the suggestion
is equally original. He argues that the trial format as it currently exists in
civil cases is incompatible not only with Bayesian conceptions of rational

It is important in this connection to note that the classroom model includes not
only Bayes's Theorem but also a utility matrix (called a "regret matrix") which
allows basic value choices and concepts like prejudice to be captured.
28 FED. R. EvID. 401. Definition of "relevant evidence":
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; Irrelevant evidence
inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
29 In his paper prepared for the symposium Professor Shafer gently criticizes my
earlier work and suggests that even heuristically Bayes's Theorem is inadequate
because it ignores the fact that evidence may be relevant on different issues. Shafer,
The Constructionof Probability Arguments, 66 B.U.L. REV. 799, 815 (1986). I don't
disagree with Professor Shafer's point but I think his criticism of my use of a
Bayesian model misunderstands the legal process. While the point is not articulated
except when controversies arise, evidence is always offered on specific issues, and
relevance is judged with respect to the issue on which it is offered. Thus, the model
applies with respect to specific issues even if the evidence might have been admissible had the proponent argued for admissibility based on its tendency to prove some
other point.
27
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decisionmaking but with Baconian and other conceptions of rationality as
well. Assuming this incompatibility exists, as I shall for purposes of this
paper, it poses starkly the questions of whether and when legal norms should
conform to norms defined in other systems. Even if the legal system has a
norm of formally rational factfinding at its core, it is not clear that this is or
should be the master norm in civil or criminal cases. I shall express my
doubts on these and other scores as I comment on Professor Allen's specific
suggestions in the last portion of this paper.
C. Descriptive Models
A third use that may be made of Bayesian or other models of reasoning is
descriptive. One might argue, for example, that Bayes's Theorem reflects
the way people actually process information. Much of the writing antagonistic to the Bayesian model appears to attack it on descriptive grounds.
Indeed, some of the non-lawyers30 who have offered non-Bayesian models of
rational reasoning appear to have been attracted to the law because they saw
in legal rules and practices good evidence that the prescriptions of Bayes's
Theorem are inconsistent with one form of apparently rational decisionmaking.
The effort to discredit Bayes's Theorem on descriptive grounds is somewhat puzzling, for we know that Bayes's Theorem does not successfully
model the decisionmaking of people who think that they are reasoning
rationally or that they are expected to do so. A body of research reveals that
people are at best inconsistent in their reasoning when judged by the standard of Bayes's Theorem; they have particular difficulty in appreciating the
and
extremes that cumulated probabilities can reach, and in some respects
31
on some issues they do not reason in a Bayesian fashion at all.
I believe that the explanation for the puzzling attack on what we know to
be a descriptively inadequate model lies in a confusion between the "is and
the ought" like that which Professor Tillers notes in the paper he prepared
for this symposium. 32 First, it appears that the critics of Bayes's Theorem
seek to demonstrate its normative inadequacy by showing that it does not
adequately model human decisionmaking. Second, those who have offered

L. COHEN, supra note 18; see generally Shafer, supra note 29.
31 See supra note 23. Note, however, that the failure of Bayes's Theorem to
30

consistently model actual behavior does not mean that it has no descriptive utility. It
might still capture central tendencies in the way people reason about some or most
issues. By analogy, the economic model of human behavior fails to capture much that
is important about human decisionmaking; but at the aggregate level and even for
certain purposes at the micro level it may offer an adequate or even a good model of
the way people will react when confronted with particular incentives. Similarly,
Bayes's Theorem may in some situations predict well particular or average effects
that certain types of information are likely to have on human decisionmaking.
32 Tillers, supra note 7, at 933.
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alternatives to Bayesian rationality seek to support the descriptive adequacy
of their schemes by showing that they conform to modes of reasoning which
the law appears to prescribe.
Ordinarily one cannot derive an "is" from an "ought," so the first argument appears suspect. However, when the issue is not the abstract issue of
what is right but rather whether the legal system should demand a certain
kind of reasoning, a good argument can be made that the "is" - "ought"
distinction should be dissolved. If people cannot in fact reason consistently
in a Bayesian fashion or if the practical problems with Bayesian interventions at trials are too severe, it may be that normative demands for Bayesian
type rationality are unsuitable for the law in that they provide no realistic
standard to guide decisions. But even if this position is rational, it is by no
means self-evidently correct. It is possible that the best way to achieve the
law's goal of rational decisionmaking is to impose Bayesian rational33 rules
31 I use the term Bayesian rational to refer to a set of rules, a system, or a process
that is "rational" in several respects. First, if evidence is to be combined with some
inferential end in view, the process by which it is combined follows the postulates of
Bayes's Theorem. Second, prior probabilities are taken seriously not just as is
implied by the preceding criterion but also in that in the absence of additional
evidence, the prior probability is treated as a posterior probability. Third, posterior
probabilities are taken seriously in that they are regarded as the decisionmaker's best
estimate of the probability that a state of affairs exists given the evidence-including
base rate evidence-relating to the likely existence of that state of affairs. Fourth, the
process, system, or rules value accurate outcomes where accuracy is defined as
correctly evaluating a true state of affairs. This last requirement does not mean that it
is Bayesian irrational to place different values on different possible decisions thus
leading to decisions which presume states of affairs that are less likely than. their
alternatives. Nor does it mean that the system cannot regard values other than
accuracy as important or even dispositive. Bayesian rationality does, however, mean
that value issues must be confronted directly and cannot be ducked by fudging the
likelihood that a state of affairs will be mischaracterized. For example, it is not
Bayesian irrational to have a system which mandates acquittals when there is an .80
chance that the defendant committed the crime charged even if the acquittal is taken
to mean that the defendant did not commit that crime. It would be irrational even if
there are good value reasons to acquit to combine evidence which justifies a posterior
probability of guilt of .80 so as to arrive at a posterior probability below .50 or to
assume that an acquittal must reflect such a probability. Finally, what is Bayesian
rational depends on the decision-making process's intended outcome. A Bayesian
rational decision at the system level may not require factfinding in the individual case
which follows Bayes's Theorem. For example, assuming factfinders could process
case-specific information in a Bayesian fashion, it might be Bayesian rational not to
allow this. First, other values might suffer from instructing factfinders to apply
Bayes's Theorem. Second, factfinders might systematically err in evaluating the
evidence that is manipulated according to Bayes's Theorem and this error might be
such that fewer long run errors are made by requiring factfinders to reason in some
other way than that required by Bayes's Theorem. These kinds of decisions are
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of evidence and procedure on trials even if the law's factfinders are not
completely or even largely Bayesian in the way they approach the evidence
presented to them.
Since the reverse is also possible, in that the law may choose to follow
rules of evidence and procedure that are inconsistent with Bayesian requirements even if factfinders largely follow a Bayesian logic, the law's rules
and procedures as norms, to the extent they are inconsistent with Bayesian
approaches, are not necessarily informative about the descriptive adequacy
of competing models of rational decisionmaking. Reference to legal issues
may be a helpful source of speculation, and even of thought experiments, but
it cannot resolve the key issues. Empirical experimentation of the kind
engaged in by Professors Schum and Martin34 is needed.
III.

SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND OBJECTIVE PARADOXES

In my view the key issues raised by Bayesian models of trial decisionmaking are normative. We might ask whether Bayes's Theorem is consistent
with the law's expectations of the fact-finding process, and we might ask
whether the fact-finding process should conform with the requisites of Bayesian rationality. Some would argue that inconsistencies between Bayesian
approaches and the norms of legal decisionmaking are as obvious as the
inconsistency between the prescriptions of Bayes's Theorem and the way
that people actually process information. Except with respect to the normative characteristics of Federal Rules 401 and 402,3 5 1 am agnostic on the issue
of whether Bayes's Theorem adequately captures the law's expectations
about how trials should proceed. I do, however, think that some of the
arguments that are used to suggest the inapplicability of Bayes's Theorem as
a model of actual trial processes are not as convincing as those who advance
them and many of those who resist them apparently assume.
Two such arguments take the form of paradoxes. They juxtapose the
apparent requirements of a Bayesian approach with the results we see in
law, and argue from the apparent inconsistency between them that Bayes's
Theorem is an inadequate model of the law's decision-making expectations.
A third argument is that a Bayesian approach to trials does not take account
of the weight of evidence and so suggests results-such as finding for
plaintiffs in civil cases whenever the ultimate Bayesian probability is above

Bayesian rational if the designer of the system evaluated in a Bayesian rational
fashion the possibility that the specific value or fact-finding goals are more likely to be
achieved under non-Bayesian than under Bayesian procedures. In other words, a
committed Bayesian might conclude from empirical evidence or the implications of
non-Bayesian value considerations that attempting to impose Bayesian procedures is
not a good way to go about a specific decision-making task.
34 Schum & Martin, supra note 23.
35 Lempert, supra note 9.
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.50, even though the evidence in support of the plaintiff is in some sense
unconvincing-that are inconsistent with the results that are and should be
reached at trials. Professor Allen relies on two "paradoxes," the conjunction paradox and the gatecrasher's paradox, in arguing that the Bayesian
model is inconsistent with the rules that currently govern trials, and he notes
the argument regarding the weight of the evidence as well. The latter argument is emphasized by Professors Brilmayer, 36 Cohen37 and Shafer- in the
papers they prepared for this symposium.
One reason why paradoxes arise when results apparently mandated by
Bayes's Theorem are compared with the result that seems intuitively right
for a legal trial is that the paradoxes are based on the manipulation of
objective probabilities while factfinding is based on subjective probabilities.
While it is true, as Professor Savage 39 and others have shown, that subjective probabilities may be manipulated according to the same probability
calculus as objective ones, and that this manipulation will give consistent,
rational (in a sense) results, we should not lose sight of the subjective nature
of probability estimates in evaluating the Bayesian rationality of the legal
system.
A.

The Conjunction Paradox

Consider first the conjunction paradox. It is well known that in a Pascalian
system the probability of two independent events, A and B, equals the
probability of A times the probability of B. 40 Professor Allen points out one
apparent implication of this fact. If there are two independent elements that
the plaintiff must prove to make a case, each representing a state of affairs
the existence of which has no implications for the existence of the other and
each of which exists with a probability of .75, their conjoint probability is
.56, and the plaintiff should recover in a civil suit since the preponderance of
the evidence standard is thought to mandate a verdict for the plaintiff
whenever his case as a whole is more likely than not (i.e., has a greater than

36 Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U.L.
681-85 (1986).

REV.

673,

37 See generally Cohen, On the Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66

B.U.L.

REV.

635 (1986).

11 See generally Shafer, supra note 29.
39 L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954).
40 This is one manifestation of the product rule. If there are two events A and B,
P(A & B) = P(A) x P(BIA); if P(BI) = P(B) then events A and B (elements of a
case in the following discussion) are independent. Note that unless P(BIA) = 1,
P(A & B) will always be less than both P(A) and P(B). The non-independence of
events does not vitiate the product rule. It simply means that P(A & B) is larger than
it would be if P(A) and P(B) were independent. But, as I suggest below, the implications of this fact for the challenge posed by the conjunction paradox are by no means
trivial.
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.50 chance) to be true. On the other hand, if there is a third element to the
plaintiff's case that is similarly independent of the other two and with the
same probability of existence, the probability that the plaintiff, who must
prove the simultaneous existence of all three elements, has met his burden in
all respects is .42, and the defendant should prevail. Yet the law apparently
requires the plaintiff to prove each element of his case by only slightly more
than a .50 probability which, given the preponderance standard, appears
inconsistent with the requisites of Bayesian rationality and likely to lead to a
plethora of wrongful plaintiff's verdicts. Not only does this recovery rule
suggest that the law does not respect Bayesian decision-making processes,
but the law seems to many to be right in this view, and it is difficult to spot
the plethora of wrongful plaintiff's verdicts which a Bayesian approach
would avoid. Thus, the law does not and should not respect the Bayesian
version of wisdom. Decisions that are incorrect from the perspective of
Bayes's Theorem are correct as a matter of both jurisprudence and justice.
There are a number of defenses that one who believes the law is Bayesian
rational (or at least is not proved Bayesian irrational by this example) may
make. Most defenses avoid the problem, but are no less likely to be correct
on this account. One might, for example, argue that the probabilities favoring the existence of the different elements of a plaintiff's case are generally
highly dependent, and that successful plaintiffs generally prove the separate
elements of their cases by far more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence. If these empirical assumptions are tenable, then in most cases in
which plaintiffs recover the conjoint probability of the necessary elements is
41
likely to above .50 as well.
A second and more intriguing defense is that the law may be Bayesian
rational without mandating a fact-finding process that combines elements in
conformity with Bayes's Theorem or its underlying axioms. 42 If one were
41 1 am aware that the empirical assumptions that support this conclusion, like the
assumption of perfect or substantial independence made by those who advance the
conjunction paradox, have not been systematically tested. One obvious source of
dependency in the evidence the factfinder receives is that evidence bearing on
different elements may come from the same witness. Thus the credibility accorded to
testimony supporting one element of a case is likely to be similar to the credibility
accorded to testimony supporting another element of a case. This means that even if
the elements of a case are conceptually independent the proof of these elements and
the factfinder's subjective probabilities of their existence need not be. In short, the
case in which a conjoint subjective probability favoring the plaintiff is .50 or less
when the subjective probabilities relating to the elements of the plaintiff's case each
exceed .50 may be empirically rare despite the mathematical plausibility of this
situation.
42 One might also argue that the conjunction paradox has nothing to do with the
Bayesian rationality of trials. The argument is that Bayes's Theorem prescribes a
way of combining evidence. Once the legally separate elements of a case have been
evaluated, there is no more evidence left to be combined. The factfinder has, for
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designing a legal system and attempting to maximize the number of correct
verdicts in civil cases, the Bayesian rational strategy would not necessarily
be to insist that factfinders assess the conjoint probabilities of separate
elements in a Bayesian fashion and render a verdict only when the conjoint
probability was in excess of .50. This decision rule is optimal only if the
estimates of the probabilities of the various elements are objectively correct.
But factfinders are limited to subjective estimates, while the law's goal is
objective truth..
A Bayesian rational design for legal decisionmaking should take the
subjectivity of factfinders into account. To deal only with the marginal case,
we are interested in the contrast between the probability that a plaintiff
actually deserves to recover, given that the factfinder believes that all elements necessary to the plaintiff's case have a slightly better than .50 chance
of being true, and the probability that the plaintiff does not deserve to
recover in these circumstances. It may be that total errors are minimized by
allowing rather than denying recovery in this situation. In other words, the
imperfections of human information processing and the fact that jurors will
not have all the information relevant to the issues they must decide may
mean that a rule that allows a recovery on conjoint subjective probabilities of
less than .50, as long as the existence of each element is thought to be more
likely than not, is from a systemic point of view Bayesian rational. More
than any other easily applied rule, it may accurately separate those cases in

example, already evaluated the evidence bearing on issue A and reached a conclusion
about its probable existence, and the same is true of issues B, C, etc. The implications of this series of findings is a legal question that Bayes's Theorem does not and
cannot address. There is, on the other hand, no conjunction paradox with respect to
evidence that tends to prove a legally required element since factfinders are expected
to follow the conjunction rule in evaluating the evidence that bears on each legally
separate element.
While I find this argument intriguing, I do not rest the case against the challenge of
the conjunction paradox on it. The law's goal is, presumably, to allow recovery when
it is more likely than not that the plaintiff deserves to recover and to deny recovery
when this is not the case. Recovery is deserved at law-I assume-when the conjunction of all the elements that the plaintiff must prove to establish his case is more likely
than not to exist. While Bayes's Theorem cannot be applied to evaluate this conjunction since it is not a conjunction of evidence, a basic rule of the probability calculus
and one of the axioms on which Bayes's Theorem rests is that P(A & B) = P(A) x
P(BIA) or, where P(BIA) = P(B), i.e., in the case of independent events, P(A & B)
= P(A) x P(B). Treating the elements of the case as events (e.g., the defendant was
negligent, or the plaintiff suffered an injury) I believe that the challenge of the
conjunction paradox is a fair one, for in a Bayesian rational system as I use the term,
the product rule must be applied where the probability of a conjunction of events is in
issue unless some other value or a Bayesian evaluation from a more encompassing
perspective precludes it.
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which plaintiffs objectively deserve to recover from those cases in which
43
they do not.
B.

The GatecrasherParadox

The paradox of the gatecrashers presents a different problem. Here 499
people have paid admission to a rodeo, but 1000 have attended;-the other 501
people sneaked in without paying. Our intuition is that if the rodeo owner
sued all the attendees and introduced no evidence other than the preceding
statistic he could not recover from anyone, although in each case the probability that the defendant was a gatecrasher was above .50. Assuming that the
preponderance of the evidence standard means a probability of liability
above .50, this result seems inconsistent with the commands of Bayes's
Theorem. Thus, this paradox also implies that Bayes's Theorem yields
results that are inconsistent with the results that are and should be reached at
44
trials.
Whether this is the case is, of course, an empirical question. I am simply arguing
that the Bayesian rationality of the trial process is not necessarily disproved by the
conjunction paradox.
44 One may argue, as Anne Martin did at the symposium that gave rise to this
issue, that the gatecrasher's paradox has no implications for the appropriateness of
Bayesian models of the legal system because Bayes's Theorem commands no result
inconsistent with our intuition but instead suggests that our intuition, in the form of
whatever prior hypothesis we held, should be followed. This is because under one
reading of the problem there is no evidence to be combined. The argument is that the
likelihood ratio, which is:
43

P(EIH)
P(Elnot-H)
where E is the evidence and H is some hypothesis of interest, in this case that the
defendant crashed the gate, is 1. This is true if we regard the evidence as the fact that
501 people crashed the gate and 499 did not. This evidence is equally likely to be
received whether or not the defendant crashed the gate and so does nothing to change
our estimation of the likelihood that the defendant is a gatecrasher from the likelihood
we estimated before receiving this information. There is nothing remarkable about
this. If evidence that is fully evaluated in the prior is again presented to the
decisionmaker, it will be redundant and will not change the judgment that has been
tentatively reached. What makes the gatecrasher case special is that it appears from
this argument that there is no information available to the factfinder except information that can be used to establish a prior. Thus Bayesian information processing
cannot proceed. Even if I accepted this argument, however, I could not avoid the
challenge posed by the gatecrasher paradox, for as I stated in note 33, supra, taking
prior probabilities seriously is a requisite of what I call Bayesian rationality. In the
"pure" gatecrasher hypothetical-that is a situation with no other evidence bearing
on the defendant's guilt and no permissible spoliation inferences-the prior probability of the defendant's gatecrashing is .501 and a plaintiff's verdict seem appropriate.
Moreover, viewing the evidence and prior probabilities in other plausible lights, there
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Professor David Kaye, in a paper cited by Professor Allen, tries to deal
is evidence that may be manipulated in a Bayesian fashion which yields a posterior
probability of .501 that the defendant crashed the gate.
Treating the base rate information as all that need be shown to make out the
plaintiff's case assumes that the defendant was at the rodeo and that the number of
ticket buyers and gatecrashers is also given. Thus, there is no information apart from
the base rate for a factfinder to assess. A different approach, which David Kaye and I
took with some consultation, has the virtue of not assuming that the defendant was
present at the rodeo, leaving this to be proved by the evidence, as would be the case
at a trial. Professor Kaye's argument proceeds along the following fines.
Let R be the event that the defendant was at the rodeo; NT the number of ticket
buyers (499); NR the number of people at the rodeo (1000); and N the number in the
relevant population to which ticket buyers and gatecrashers belong. The posterior
odds are the likelihood ratio times the prior odds:
P(TIR)
P(TjR)-

P(R4T) P(T)

(1)

P(PIT) P(T)(

First, consider the likelihood ratio P(RIT)/P(RIT). If everyone who paid for a ticket
went to the rodeo, thnn P(RIT) = 1. If everyone in the relevant population who did
not pay for a ticket is equally likely to have gone to the rodeo, then P(RIT), which is
the probability that someone went to the rodeo given that he did not buy a ticket, is
simply the number of people who went to the rodeo without buying a ticket, NRT =
NR - NT = 501, divided by the number of people in the relevant population who did
not buy tickets, N

= N - NT = N - 499. Thus,

P(RIT)
P(RIT)

NRr/Nr
1

_

501

(2)

N - 499(

Next, continuing to treat everybody in the relevant population as initially identical,
the prior odds are the proportion of non-ticket buyers in the relevant population, P(T)
= N-IN = (N - NT)/N = (N - 499)/N, divided by the proportion of ticket buyers,
P(T) = N7 N = 499/N. Hence,
P(T)

P(T)

= (N - 499)/N
N/499

= N - 499

499

(3)

(3)

Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) gives the odds that a person who is shown to have
been at the rodeo did not pay for a ticket:
P(TIR)
P(TIR)

501
N - 499

N - 499
499

= 501
499

My own attempt to grapple with the problem reaches the same result more simply by
directly estimating the prior odds according to the formula (in which GC stands for
being a gatecrasher and R for being at the rodeo):
O(GCjR)

=

P(RIGC)
P(RIGC)

0GQ

x O(GC).
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with the paradox. 45 He recognizes that subjective probabilities may vary
from apparently objective ones, and argues that it may be appropriate to
hold as a matter of law that the factfinder's subjective probability in the
gatecrasher hypothetical must be less than .50, and that a verdict should be
directed for the defendant. This rule, Kaye suggests, gives plaintiffs an
incentive to offer more than background statistics. Indeed, it is arguably
unreasonable in this case to allow a juror to reach a subjective probability of
liability above .50 since the plaintiff's failure to offer more information,
when the rule is that he must, itself counts as evidence against the plaintiff.
Professor Allen argues that Kaye's incentive rationale avoids the hypothetical, and the claim that is even stronger with respect to the spoliation
argument.

This solution has the virtue of emphasizing that the factfinder may begin with the
assumption that the defendant is no more likely than anyone else in the relevant
population (of size N) to have been a gatecrasher. Thus, the prior odds are consistent
both with one tenable definition of the presumption of innocence (albeit a matter not
in issue in the example since we are supposing a civil suit) as well as with the
situation of a factfinder who starts a trial with no knowledge other than the fact that
an actionable offense, or in the gatecrasher case some number of offenses, has
occurred. The fact that the defendant was at the rodeo is evidence and the number of
ticket buyers at the rodeo is information needed to evaluate the implications of that
evidence. The only necessary assumptions are that all gatecrashers and ticket buyers
attended-and may be shown to have attended-the rodeo, and that everyone in the
relevant population has an apparently equal propensity to crash the gate. The prior
odds, O(GC), are 501:(N - 501), since knowing nothing but the number of gatecrashers the odds of the defendant's being a gatecrasher is the ratio of that number
(501) to the number of people in the population who are not gatecrashers (N - 501).
Alternatively
O(GC) = P(GC)
P(GC)

_

501/N
(N - 501)/N

_

501
N - 501

Since it is certain that the defendant will be at the rodeo if he is a gatecrasher, and the
probability that he will be at the rodeo if he is not a gatecrasher equals the number of
ticket buyers (499) divided by the total population minus the number of gatecrashers,
the formula for the posterior odds becomes:
1/499
(N - 501)

×

501
(N - 501)

501
-9-9

4 Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasherand Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. Sr. L.J.
101. See also Fienberg, Gatecrashers,Blue Buses and the Bayesian Representation
of Legal Evidence, 66 B.U.L. REV. 693 (1986).
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If Professor Kaye's argument avoids the hypothetical, it at least suggests a
good policy reason why the state should place the burden of acquiring more
evidence on plaintiffs even in cases where it is impossible for plaintiffs to do
so. The reason is that in the real world we will never be sure if the conditions
of the hypothetical are met; much more often than not they won't be met,
and more information will be available to the plaintiff. Thus, if we seek a rule
which over the run of actual cases will minimize errors, a rule imposing a
burden of producing more than background statistics on plaintiffs will do so.
The fact that the law rejects the apparent commands of Bayesian rationality
and the preponderance of the evidence standard in specific cases in order to
minimize error in the long run does not mean that46the law is, from a systemic
standpoint, adopting a Bayesian irrational rule.
Now let us put aside any policy reasons for directing a verdict against the
plaintiffs and give a fully Bayesian argument that the plaintiff should not be
able to get to the jury. The argument, following Professor Kaye, 47 is an
argument from spoliation. It is that the plaintiff's failure to provide additional information is itself informative. Since the hypothetical provides that
the plaintiff has offered evidence which on its face barely exceeds the
more-probable-than-not threshold, any spoliation inference that should rationally be drawn against the plaintiff will entitle the defendant to a directed
verdict.
Let us consider the objections that may be made against this position. The
first is Professor Allen's argument that it may be as easy for the defendant to
offer non-statistical evidence as it is for the plaintiff to do so. Indeed, in the
gatecrasher situation the defendants are likely to be in a better position than
the plaintiff to offer non-statistical evidence since if tickets were issued some
innocent defendants might have kept their ticket stubs and all defendants
could testify under oath that they had in fact paid. But despite these possibilities, Professor Allen's critique misses an important point. This point is
that the law currently imposes a burden on plaintiffs-but not on
defendants-to go forward with evidence. The question is whether at the
close of the plaintiff's case, at a time when the defendant has had no chance
to present evidence, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff's case is
more probable than not. The fact that the plaintiff's case might be
strengthened when the defendant presents or fails to present a case does not
at this time enter into the court's decision. So long as this is the preexisting
rule and plaintiffs have strong incentives to present accessible probative
evidence, granting each defendant a directed verdict in the gatecrasher
Responding to Professor Kaye, Professor Allen also argues that if the plaintiff
can produce more evidence so can the defendant. This does not follow, for the ability
to produce more evidence is likely to be conditional on the existence of liability and
on the issues the plaintiff chooses to raise. See the discussion in the text following
note 67 infra.
47 Kaye, supra note 45. See also Lempert, supra note 9; Tribe, supra note 10.
46
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situation will be consistent with a Bayesian evaluation of the probabilities
whenever it appears that other evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim
would have been available had the claim been meritorious.
In the gatecrasher case, for example, if the plaintiff really thought that
defendant A was a gatecrasher, why didn't he call A to the stand, put him
under oath, and ask him whether he had paid for his admission? Since the
notion that one "vouches" for the credibility of his witnesses has been
generally discarded and "hostile" witnesses can be impeached, there is little
to be lost. One cannot assume that A would lie and, even if A had lied,
cross-examination might have revealed A's deception. A possible reason for
plaintiff's decision not to call A is that the plaintiff, perhaps based on A's
demeanor during a discovery deposition, had reason to believe that A was
more likely than not telling the truth when he claimed he had payed. Thus
the failure to call48A may be informative, suggesting that it is more likely than
not that A paid.
There are at least two objections that might be made to this attempt to
reconcile the gatecrasher paradox with Bayesian rationality. The first is
Professor Allen's claim, directed against Kaye, that it avoids the hypothetical; the second is that we would decide the same way if 80% of the attendees
at the rodeo had crashed the gate. In the latter circumstance, despite the
spoliation inference, a reasonable jury at the end of the plaintiff's case might
believe that it was more likely than not that a particular defendant had failed
to pay. I shall deal with this latter objection first.
This possibility is embodied in another familiar problem case which is
commonly regarded as inconsistent with the view that the law contemplates
Bayesian rational factfinding. This case is usually expressed not in terms of
gatecrashers but by reference to red and blue taxi cabs or blue and green
buses, one of which has hit the plaintiff in a situation where both negligence
and the impossibility of any more specific identification is clear. The argument proceeds on the assumption that a court would properly grant a
directed verdict for the defendant in this situation. In my view the assumption is wrong, or if it is correct it is correct for a reason which suggests no
necessary inconsistency between the application of a Bayesian model (in a
world where the preponderance of the evidence standard is conceptualized
as a greater than .50 probability that the defendant is liable) and the rules
governing proof at trials.
First, consider the matter at the level of intuition. Assume we are
confident that the plaintiff has actually been injured by a negligent bus
driver, that the bus belongs to one of two companies, and that it is impossible
48 There is, I will admit, only the weakest of inferences to be drawn from the
plaintiff's failure to call A in the context of the gatecrasher hypothetical, but as the
hypothetical is posed even a slight spoliation inference will change the balance of
probabilities so that the plaintiff is no longer favored. In actual cases, or even in
factually richer hypothetical cases, stronger inferences are likely to exist.
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for the plaintiff to offer any evidence about which company's bus was
responsible. Is there anything offensive about denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case? I see no great
cost in allowing such a case to survive a directed verdict and forcing the
larger bus company to present evidence-e.g., testimony as to its bus
schedules, testimony from its drivers that on the night in question they
had injured no one--or risk liability. After all, statistical evidence is introduced in trials all the time. In a sex discrimination suit, for example, the
plaintiff's case may rest on an equation which is not only acknowledged to be
an imperfect representation of the defendant's employment policies but, if
perfect, indicates some probability (e.g., one chance in twenty) that the data
would be equally or more suggestive of discrimination although the defen49
dant had done nothing illegal.
One troublesome observation that some people have made in discussing
the blue bus hypothetical is that if such suits are allowed to proceed the
larger bus company will end up paying for all the bus accidents in town.
Putting aside the question of whether this is more troublesome than generating a string of injured and deserving plaintiffs who never recover and the fact
that in most future bus cases plaintiffs either will be unable to explain their
lack of non-statistical evidence or defendants will be able to rebut the
plaintiffs' claims, let me simply note that the objection if well taken does not
threaten a Bayesian characterization of trial fact-finding norms. Bayes's
Theorem as a normative model only tells us how information should be
processed. It doesn't tell us when other values should outweigh a probabilistic judgment that favors the plaintiff. Thus, a decision to direct a verdict for
defendants because it is unfair that the larger bus company always pays does
not call into question the claim that the Bayesian approach captures the
essential norms of trial factfinding any more than does the exclusion of
privileged information, which prevents a fully informed assessment of all the
facts.
Finally, it might be argued that the law of the blue bus hypothetical is
inconsistent with my characterization of what a sensitive intuition suggests.
The case most often cited on this point is Smith v. Rapid Transit Company. 0
49 Consider also antitrust actions, where the damages sought rest on statistical
estimates of the harm done. The jury is not required to limit the plaintiff's damage
award to the lower bound of a 95% confidence interval around a damage estimate. If,
for example, the jury settles on the point estimate of damages, there is a substantial
chance that the plaintiff has received more than he deserved, but we are not troubled
by this. If damages had to be set at the lower bound of the 95% interval, plaintiffs
would ordinarily receive less than they deserved.
50 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945). In Smith the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that a directed verdict was properly issued for the defendant when the
only evidence suggesting that the defendant owned a bus allegedly responsible for the
plaintiff's accident was that the defendant was the only bus company that had a
franchise to operate a bus on the street where the accident occurred, and that the
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Smith, however, is only one case, and it is not the hypothetical case of the
colored buses. Few consciences would have been shocked had Smith been
decided the other way. Smith did not involve naked statistical evidence.
There was other evidence, relating to bus schedules and the like, suggesting
that if Mrs. Smith's story about her injury and her inability to offer more
detailed information was believed, then the bus company was indeed responsible for her accident. While these additional facts might argue against my
position if the decision in Smith were clearly correct, I think they undercut
the power of Smith to persuade. Certainly those who make the case against
allowing verdicts based on naked statistical evidence do not claim to be able
to extend their arguments to situations where there is additional information
of the kind that existed in Smith. Indeed, in somewhat analogous situations
such as those in Summers v. Tice5" and Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories2

courts have been praised for creative solutions allowing recoveries to plaintiffs who because of the nature of their injuries cannot prove the responsibility of particular defendants by a preponderance of the evidence.
This brings me to the charge that I, like Kaye, have ducked the hypothetical. I shall respond by confession and avoidance, but the avoidance shall
precede the confession. The problem of the gatecrasher may be acknowledged and avoided by pointing to the uncertainty-given the subjectivity of
factfinding-that will exist about whether the conditions of the gatecrasher
hypothetical are met. These conditions are that the only evidence against the
defendants is that they are members of a group, 50.1% of whom owe the
plaintiff money, and that the plaintiff cannot possibly bring any more specific
evidence of violation against any of the defendants. These are stringent
conditions and only the plaintiff will know fully-and then only if some effort
is expended-if they pertain. If plaintiffs are allowed to get to the jury by
showing that naked statistics are the only evidence available, they will have
an incentive to falsely create the appearance that this is the case. In particular, they will seek to avoid the expense of ascertaining whether more particular evidence is available and the possibility that they will uncover evidence
that exonerates innocent defendants who could not exonerate themselves at
trial. 3 The result is that a general rule directing verdicts for defendants in
defendant company's bus schedule was perhaps consistent with the involvement of
one of its buses in the accident. The court quoted from an earlier Massachusetts case:
"[It is] not enough that mathematically the chances somewhat favor a proposition to
be proved; for example, the fact that colored automobiles made in the current year
outnumber black ones would not warrant a finding that an undescribed automobile of
the current year is colored and not black ....
Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident
Co., 307 Mass. 246, 250, 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1940).
51 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
51226 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
51 In the extreme case where the plaintiff in the gatecrasher situation could identify
specifically all 501 gatecrashers, the 499 others who might, on a balance of prob-
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gatecrasher situations is likely, over the run of cases, to lead to more
accurate factfinding by the law's preponderance of the evidence standard. A
rule, in other words, works better than subjective case-by-case determinations. A decision rule which appears not to be Bayesian rational in a particular case is consistent with a Bayesian rational system.
But suppose we are not allowed to appeal either to Kaye's value of
providing plaintiffs with incentives to uncover specific information or to my
value of achieving more correct decisions by the law's more-probable-thannot criterion over the run of cases. Then we must confront the hypothetical
head on. In these circumstances, where the plaintiff cannot present nonstatistical evidence and we cannot refer to other values, I think the intuitions
that the plaintiff should not recover and that the law would not allow
recovery are incorrect. They are incorrect because both our intuitions and
the law's apparent rules are based on situations actually encountered or on
the contemplation of situations which implicitly contain other ingredients,
such as the possibility of spoliation inferences. If we encountered pure
naked statistical inference cases like the gatecrasher hypothetical with any
frequency, both our intuitions and the law's rules would change. Indeed, in
cases like Sindell or in cases where statistical evidence is often the best if not
the only mode of proof, both our intuitions and the law accept judgments
that rest largely on the weight of impersonal, quantified probabilities which
on their face make clear an ineducible probability of error.
If the pure gatecrasher case arose with any frequency, we would begin to
feel sorry for starving rodeo operators (or we would strongly object to the
hefty ticket prices that honest people were charged), and the law would
accommodate itself to the situation. The simplest accommodation would be
to allow the statistical evidence to place on defendants the burden of going
forward, but this would only work if it were possible for defendants to
present exonerative evidence. In the pure hypothetical, this possibility is
ruled out. A second response would be to stick with the traditional rule to
encourage rodeo operators to take steps to prevent gatecrashing. If this
possibility is also ruled out, the hypothetical world in which gatecrasher
cases continue to arise becomes increasingly distant from the world we live
in. If we may nevertheless generalize from our legal world, we see, in the
movement toward comparative negligence and, in cases like Sindell joint
responsibility, the likelihood that strictly legal solutions, probably involving
some form of proportionate recovery and liability, would arise. What is
unlikely is that a rule directing verdicts against plaintiffs who can present
abilities, have been found responsible will have their cases dismissed. Indeed, once
three defendants are specifically identified as gatecrashers, in each subsequent case
the revised naked statistics (499 ticket buyers; 498 unidentified gatecrashers) mean
that it is more probable than not that a given defendant purchased a ticket. Thus, if
naked statistical evidence were sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
in the gatecrasher hypothetical would have a strong incentive to suppress better,
more particular evidence that might be available in a few cases.
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only naked statistical evidence would endure. This seems right to us only
because in this world our intuitions and the law have been conditioned by
superficially similar cases from which careless generalization is easy.
Consider the following hypothetical case. 501 people pay to attend a
rodeo. They pay their money and are allowed in but receive no ticket stubs.
Then 499 people crash the gate. The incensed manager calls off the production before it begins and does not refund any money. A suit is brought by X
to recover his admission fee. X can offer only the statistical evidence
and-although it is difficult to imagine the situation-his failure to offer other
evidence has no implication for the likelihood that he paid his way in. Will
the rodeo manager be allowed to deny recovery to X and everyone like
him?5 4 Why should the resolution of the gatecrasher's paradox turn in the
pure case on the identity of the moving party? Should the law allow this
situation to exist where no other values, like the stability of expectations,
55
exist? I think not.
C.

The Weight of the Evidence

Finally, let me turn to the weight of the evidence. The most fundamental
and interesting challenge to Bayesian models of legal decisionmaking is that
they do not describe how factfinders process evidence and cannot in principle do so since factfinders respond to a sense of the weight of the evidence
which is incommensurate with Bayesian probabilities. The argument is that
this in principle disjunction between what Bayes's Theorem requires and
how legal factfinding proceeds means that Bayes's Theorem is both descriptively and normatively an inadequate model of what the law expects of its
factfinders since it leads to results which would not and should not be
reached by the legal system. For example, situations may exist in which on
the balance of probabilities it appears more likely than not that the defendant
is liable to the plaintiff but the plaintiff's evidence is so slight that he will not
and should not be allowed to recover. If so, Bayes's Theorem neither
captures the law's norms nor, where it differs
from the law's norms, makes a
56
normative claim that we should respect.
I do not wish to assert that there is no in principle distinction between
Bayesian models and weight-of-the-evidence models of decisionmaking, for
54 With respect to the evidence available to the court, X's situation is like that of all
those at the rodeo, paying customers and gatecrashers alike.
55 Of course, I acknowledge that the law has tie-breaking rules that typically
disadvantage those challenging the status quo. I am arguing that our intuitions about
the right result in the gatecrasher case do not turn on the need for such rules and that
we better appreciate the questionable basis of the intuitions that many people express
regarding the pure case when we ponder the reverse situation.
56 I am just discussing the weight of the evidence issue in respect to the law, but it
is this issue which is at the heart of the broader debate about how we should think
about evidence and the nature of rational reasoning. See, e.g., L. COHEN, supra note
18; G. SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE (1976).
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coherent and inconsistent logical systems have been generated on the basis
of these different perspectives. However, with respect to the law, I do not
believe that a convincing case has been made that the Bayesian model yields
results that are inconsistent with the results that arise when a court or jury
evaluates the weight of the evidence in accordance with legal norms. The
intuitive argument that it does generally rests on the proposition that one can
imagine civil cases in which the probability that the defendant is liable
appears from a Bayesian perspective to be above .50, but such scanty
evidence has been offered in support of the plaintiff's case that a jury is
properly not convinced that the defendant's liability has been shown by a
preponderance of the evidence.
I question whether cases like this hypothetical in fact exist. I think the
examples generally offered to support this proposition implicitly assume a
Bayesian prior of 1:1, or something close to it, and then assume that
whenever the likelihood ratio for the scanty evidence that is offered favors
the plaintiff, applying Bayes's Theorem yields a posterior probability above
.50. From this it is assumed that the plaintiff has, according to the Bayesian
model, proved his case by a preponderance of the evidence although the
case is unconvincing.
The mistake here is in implicitly or explicitly setting the Bayesian prior at
1:1. Although a civil jury should not favor one side over another, this is, in
terms of my model of relevance, a matter captured by a regret matrix and not
by Bayes's Theorem.5 7 Bayes's Theorem refers solely to the processing of
information-that is, to an empirical process. The law's norms cannot set
the Bayesian prior; the "ought" of not favoring either side cannot determine
'' 8 What then
the "is.
is the proper prior? This is, of course, the sticking
point in all attempts to apply a Bayesian approach to real world decisionmaking. Although any subjective estimate of the prior odds is often tolerable
when we are discussing the in principle applicability of Bayes's Theorem as
a normative model of legal reasoning, a similar looseness is not tolerable
when we are concerned with the posterior probabilities at which a Bayesian
factfinder should arrive.
51Lempert, supra note 9, at 1032. In other words, no legal norm suggests that a
factfinder should, before the parties present their cases, hold the tenative position

that it is as likely as not that the plaintiff deserves to recover. Rather, the factfinder
should throughout the litigation hold the belief that a mistaken decision for the

plaintiff is as regretable as a mistaken decision for the defendant.
58 The presumption of innocence may appear to do this, but I think it is largely
concerned with an attitude the jurors should take in evaluating evidence rather than
with specifying a prior probability to be revised in the light of the evidence in the
case. It does, however, operate in a negative way with respect to the setting of priors,

for it instructs jurors that certain information they have at the beginning of a case,
such as the fact that the defendant has been arrested, should not enter into their prior
probabilities. Moreover, the attitude captured by the presumption of innocence may
be more consistent with some prior probabilities than with others.
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I suggest that in all cases, civil and criminal, the prior probability of the
matter in question be set at an odds of one to one less than the number of
actors in the world. In other words, at the outset of the fact-finding process
the defendant should be thought to be no more likely to be guilty or liable
than he would be if responsibility were allocated by a lottery in which every
actor in the world had the same chance of being selected. 59 With absolutely
no information, I see no other empirically justified starting point. 60 To pursue
the argument, imagine a Bayesian information processing machine that
starts with this suggested prior. The Bayesian machine may of necessity
receive evidence sequentially, but it evaluates information together. Thus,
the first likelihood ratio it calculates is:
P(AIH)
P(Alnot-H)
where A is an item of evidence and H is an hypothesis--e.g., that the
defendant acted negligently-at issue in the case. The second likelihood
ratio the machine calculates is:

59 An exception exists in cases like the gatecrasher case where we know that more
than one person has engaged in an activity. Here the appropriate prior is the ratio of
the number of actors known to have engaged in that activity to the number of actors
in the world minus the number known to have engaged in the activity. (Actors need
not be human beings, but may be other entities such as corporations.)
Legal factfinders, of course, face issues other than the identity issue I am discussing in the text. With respect to issues like motive, it is more difficult to specify an
objective referent that, even if only in theory, may be used to indicate appropriate
prior odds. Nevertheless, I think the same principle does apply; for example, in the
case of motive, the prior odds can be set in principle at an estimate of one to the
number of all possible other motives that might explain a behavior at issue. That is,
except insofar as a behavior itself suggests that some motives are more likely than
others, a factfinder without further evidence should not, before receiving other
evidence, regard one motive as more likely to explain that behavior than other
possible motives.
60 Some have suggested that 1:1 is the appropriate beginning odds for someone
who is ignorant of a true state of affairs. I believe that Professor Shafer has shown the
problems this can cause. G. SHAFER, supra note 56. With respect to my suggestion, I
am not saying that this is the prior the factfinder should have before hearing the first
item of evidence. Rather this is the prior the factfinder should proceed from as he or
she begins to think about the case. Much that is learned or assumed before any
evidence is given will properly affect the prior a factfinder holds when the first item of
evidence is presented. For example, it is reasonable for a factfinder to assume that
only those in some local population of which the defendant is a member could have
engaged in the charged behavior (e.g., the population of people who could have been
in a particular location at a particular time). This will dramatically reduce the prior
and is a harmless leap so long as evidence of the defendant's ability to get to the
location is presented at the trial and is not "double counted."
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P(A&BIH)
P(A&Blnot-H)
and so on until:
P(A&B& ...

P(A&B& ...

NIH)

Nlnot-H)

is calculated. This procedure allows the dependency of information to be
taken fully into account, and it provides for the anomalous situation in which
the direction in which evidence cuts is reversed upon the receipt of new
evidence. 61 If after receiving each item of evidence the Bayesian machine
spewed out a tentative posterior probability, we would see that early evidence drastically reduced the odds against the hypothesis. For example, in
an auto accident negligence suit where a hit-and-run defendant denied involvement in the accident, the evidence that the defendant drove a car would
reduce the odds of the defendant's responsibility from one to whatever
number of people inhabit the world to one to whatever number of people
drive cars. Evidence that the defendant usually drove in the vicinity of the
accident would reduce the odds against the defendant's involvement by a
further substantial amount. Ultimately, however, to prove that it was more
likely than not that the defendant was responsible, more specific evidence
would be required. I will assert-and can only assert, for this example must
be left at the level of thought experiment-that whenever the final probability spewed out by the Bayesian machine proceeding in this fashion exceeded
.50 on all the evidence presented, including permissible spoliation inferences, the evidence would be sufficiently weighty for the law to allow the
verdict to stand. If so, there is no in principle distinction between decisions
apparently justified by a Bayesian approach in a world where the preponderance of the evidence standard is conceptualized as a greater than .50 probability that the plaintiff's claim is correct, and those decisions that the law's
62
norms require.

61 For example, evidence that the defendant in a murder case received a ticket for
running a red light at a point from which it was difficult but not impossible to reach
the scene of the crime by the time of the murder suggests the defendant is innocent,
as it appears less likely than it would have without the evidence that the defendant
was at the scene of the crime at the crucial time. However, if it is also revealed that
the defendant had a full view of a police officer when he ran the red light, the
evidence of the defendant's location is more probative of guilt than innocence; it now
appears that the defendant wanted to get ticketed, a desire consistent with seeking to
establish an alibi in contemplation of committing the crime.
62 Note that with a Bayesian machine and objective information about probabilities
the conjunction rule should apply where more than one element had to be proved to
make out a case. That is, if the probability of each of three independent elements that
the plaintiff had to prove to make his case was .75, the plaintiff would lose because
there was less than a .50 chance that events had occurred in such a way that the
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I think that the description of the Bayesian machine takes care of the
suggestion that Bayesian conclusions are in principle different from and less
in accord with the law's norms about trial decisionmaking than the decisions
reached by the non-Bayesian weighing of conflicting evidence. While the
defense of Bayes's Theorem might thus stop here, there is one final point I
would like to make, a point which involves accepting the implicit premise
that the appropriate Bayesian prior in a civil case is an odds ratio of 1:1. I do
this not because I think the assumption is correct but because it helps
illuminate another problem caused by deriving objective paradoxes from
subjective probabilities.
The claim is basically that if Bayes's Theorem is a model of trials the
factfinder applying a preponderance of the evidence standard must always
find for the plaintiff when the hypothesis the plaintiff seeks to establish has a
better than .50 chance of being true, and must find for the defendant in all
other instances. This argument, in Professor Allen's terms, is the argument
of negation. Bayesian probabilities on H and not-H must sum to one. Thus
there appears no way to withhold judgment and ask for more information.
The validity of this argument depends on how the law's standard is
phrased. If the law commands factfinders to decide for the plaintiff whenever
the posterior Bayesian probability exceeds .50 and for the defendant otherwise, the law is treating subjective probabilities or degrees of belief as
objective ones and there is no third option. However, if the law recognizes
the factfinder's subjectivity and commands factfinders to find for the plaintiff
when they are satisfiedthat the posterior probability is above .50 and for the
defendant otherwise, factfinders have three options. They should find for the
plaintiff when they are satisfied that there is more than a .50 chance that the
plaintiff deserves to recover. They should find for the defendant when they are
satisfied that there is a .50 chance or less that the plaintiff should recover,
and they should find for the defendant when they see gaps or other flaws in
the plaintiff's case that makes them feel uneasy about giving the plaintiff the
verdict even though, if forced to guess, they would think it more likely than
not that the plaintiff should prevail.
If this third option seems unfamiliar in civil cases, it is not unfamiliar in the
law. In criminal cases a "reasonable doubt" is commonly defined for jurors
not in probabilistic terms but as the kind of doubt that would cause them to
hesitate in a matter of great personal import. It is not irrational or inconsistent with the expectation that factfinders will reason in a Bayesian fashion to
place on plaintiffs the burden of removing the factfinder's uncertainty about
whether a probability that apparently exceeds .50 actually does so.A Factplaintiff deserved to recover. I believe that if the accuracy and objectivity of my
hypothetical machine could be guaranteed, the law would allow the conjunction rule,
for the law's concern would be with the probability that the plaintiff was more likely
than not entitled to recover on the case taken as a whole.
63 See also Cohen, supra note 5. I think that Professor Cohen's concern with
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finders are not Bayesian machines, and it may be that fact-finding accuracy
will in the long run be enhanced rather than hindered by respecting difficult
to identify sources of discomfort." 4
Moreover, there is a common law tradition that jurors should not reach
verdicts based largely on speculaton. Speculation may yield a subjective
probability or degree of belief in the plaintiff's case that is above .50, but the
probability estimate may be based on so little evidence that it is insufficient
as a matter of law to justify a plaintiff's verdict no matter how high it is.
Thus, the law may expect factfinders to reason in a Bayesian fashion, but it
must also recognize that this expectation will at best be imperfectly
achieved. In the resulting second-best world, it may make sense, even if the
only concern is accurate factfinding, not to require the rigid transformation
of uncertain Bayesian posterior probabilities above .50 into plaintiffs' verdicts. Legal factfinders, unlike our ideal Bayesian machine, may start with
unduly high prior probabilities, or they may overvalue redundant evidence
because it is dificult to appreciate the implications of dependency. Indeed, it
may be that errors like these lead to difficult to articulate sources of unease
with what on a conscious balance of the probabilities appears to be the appropriate final verdict."
IV.

RECONCEPTUALIZING TRIALS

If, as I have suggested in the preceding section, the paradoxes that
Professor Allen and others draw on to show an inescapable disjunction
between a Bayesian rational fact-finding process and the fact-finding process
apparently prescribed by legal norms do not exist or do not suggest such a
fundamental disjunction, it is unnecessary to proceed as Professor Allen
"weight of evidence" issues is well placed, but I do not mean to endorse all the
arguments he makes for his position.
14 Note that if the source of discomfort is, as it may often be, a spoliation
inference--e.g., if defendant were really liable why didn't the plaintiff present evidence of X-the discomfort fits nicely into the Bayesian model and would, if the
source were appreciated, lower the final probability judgment. As Arthur Conan
Doyle showed us and as others have documented, see R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra
note 23, people often do not appreciate the relevance of "negative" evidence.
Nevertheless we may perhaps feel less confident of analyses because of dogs that
never barked.
65 In addition, other values that have nothing to do with the style of information
processing expected of legal factfinders may justify the "not persuaded" alternative.
We might, for example, want to induce the parties, especially the plaintiff, to offer
more or better quality evidence, or we might not want factfinders to leave trials
dissatisfied with the verdicts they felt compelled to return. If these are our motives,
the legal system's choices do not prefer non-Bayesian to Bayesian modes of proof.
They simply elevate other values above a conception of rational factfinding that,
however defined, has no place for such values in it.
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does to "reconceptualize" trials. Thus, on my own view of the situation
there may be nothing more to say.6 6 However, since I have been invited to
comment on Professor Allen's arguments and have hardly discharged this
obligation to this point, I shall assume the disjunction Professor Allen
articulates and focus on his suggested solution.
Before I turn to the specifics of Professor Allen's proposal I wish to
emphasize the boldness of his scheme. It is bold in two ways. First, Professor Allen does not follow the lead of most critics of Bayesian rational models
and argue that if real decisionmaking does not conform to our abstract
models then the models should be changed. Rather he accepts the models, or
at least the premises of rationality built into them, as normative and argues
that if trials are not rational in the same way the models are, it is the rules of
trial proof that should be changed. Second, although Professor Allen speaks
about reconceptualizing trials, he in fact argues for reformulating trials. That
is, he is not just suggesting a new way of conceiving of trials or thinking
about them. Rather, he is prescribing a new set of legal rules. These rules
have implications for the admissibility of evidence, the instructions given
jurors, and the issuance of directed verdicts.
While I genuinely admire Professor Allen's boldness and creativity, I have
considerable difficulty both with the specific suggestions he makes and the
more general position that underlies them. Professor Allen's analysis begins
with the observation that in civil cases the law should be indifferent between
errors that favor plaintiffs and errors that favor defendants and should aim at
minimizing the overall error rate in the long run. In other words, for Professor Allen the rules of proof should be neutral between the parties. This
position is facially consistent with the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil cases, and so is firmly rooted in a legal norm. Professor Allen
goes on to imply that rational decisionmaking, of a Pascalian or Baconian
kind, will tend to bring about this state of affairs. Since he sees inconsistencies between the decisions likely to be reached using either of these two
general approaches and the decisions that the current rules of trial practice
are likely to yield, he argues that the rules of trial practice should be
changed.
This approach, for all its originality, leaves important questions unanswered. The first is why we should define a rational system of proof for civil
66 The same is true if one finds the models offered by Professors Cohen, Shafer and
others to be models of rational decisionmaking and accepts the claim that the
processes such models describe are generally similar to those that characterize trials.
Professor Allen, of course, attempts to show that such models give rise to some of the
same paradoxes as the Bayesian model and so, as models of the trial process, they
share many of the Bayesian model's alleged deficiencies. I have some difficulty with
the arguments that Professor Allen advances to make this point, but since the
proponents of these models are, unlike the Reverend Bayes, still active scholars, I
shall leave to them the task of answering that portion of Professor Allen's argument
that bears on their theories.
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trials solely in terms of the minimization of equally weighted plaintiff and
defense errors. To say that this decision respects the law's norm or definition
of rationality as articulated in the civil burden of proof-the answer Professor Allen's discussion implies-will not do, for according to Professor Allen
the pursuit of this norm requires changes in other norms of trial proof which
on their face have as much claim to be respected as that implied by the civil
burden. Moreover, it is clearly not irrational for a system of trial proof to
pursue ends other than or in addition to the minimization of verdict errors,
for trials serve values other than the dispensation of justice by the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Professor Allen acknowledges this point, 67 but his argument at times
comes perilously close to denying it. For example, the scheme he suggests
relies more than the current system on effective pretrial discovery. This
suggests the likelihood of increased disputing over discovery-related matters. The potential social costs of discovery disputes are obvious, and the
legal system's rules might well recognize them. The situation is similar
where values reflect concerns less easily measured. For example, Professor
Allen writes:
The only justification for such rules is that some evidence cannot be
understood, which includes being put to an inappropriate purpose such
as unfairly prejudicing a party.6
This assertion is not self-evidently valid. With respect to the admissibility of
evidence, privileges provide a clear counter-example, for they exclude evidence for reasons other than those Professor Allen asserts. With respect to
the sufficiency question, it is similarly possible for values other than rational
factfinding to prevail. For example, we may not want to allow a case like that
of the gatecrashers to rest on statistical proof because we regard this as
intolerably dehumanizing. The defendant is being found liable not for who he
is personally but for a category to which he belongs. Just as we would not
allow a defendant in a job discrimination case to offer statistical evidence
showing that on the average blacks or women perform less well than whites
or men, so we may not wish to allow civil suits to proceed based solely on
evidence that the defendant belongs to some broadly defined class more than
half of whose members owe the plaintiff money. The symbolic nature of
allocating responsibility on the basis of the statistical characteristics of
members of a broadly defined class may be especially and properly disvalued
by the law when stigma attaches to the finding of responsibility, as it does
when a person has been shown to have acted carelessly or, even worse, to
have sneaked into a rodeo without paying.
Finally, it is not clear what it means to be neutral between parties.

67
66

See Allen, supra note 11, at 428 & n.66.
Id. at 428.
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Professor Allen's proposal, for example, will largely foreclose directed verdicts for defendants at the close of plaintiff's cases, for the jury under his
scheme will be charged not with weighing the general plausibility of the
plaintiff's case, but with weighing the plausibility of the plaintiff's case
against that of the case which the defendant offers. This allows plaintiffs to
impose greater costs on defendants than they can under the current system,
and may affect the propensity of plaintiffs to bring marginal or "strike"
suits. Also, those cases that under the current system do not get to the jury
will, by virtue of their weakness, almost always result in judgments for the
defendant after the defense case is presented. Consequently; unnecessary
costs, which are deadweight social losses, will be imposed on defendants.
A related question that Professor Allen leaves unanswered is why either a
Pascalian or Baconian approach is an appropriate model of rationality for the
trial system. I will not discuss this issue in detail, except to point out that a
strength of Professor Allen's general argument becomes a weakness when
the discussion switches to specific ways to reformulate trials. If Professor
Allen is correct in his claim that both Pascalian and Baconian models do not
fit the rules of proof that govern trials, trial processes appear irrational when
judged by either of the predominant formal approaches to the question of
human rationality. This perspective is original and is a strength of Professor
Allen's argument, since it suggests that whatever our conception of rational
decisionmaking, if that is our goal we should be troubled by the procedures
that have emerged to govern trials.
This strength becomes a weakness, however, when specific reformulations of trial practices are suggested. Pascalian and Baconian approaches
suggest different ways of evaluatifig the rationality of trial decisionmaking
and of minimizing error by appropriate criteria of rationality. Having proposed a reformulation of trial procedures, Professor Allen must choose a
model of rational decisionmaking against which his proposals can be judged.
He does not. Even if Professor Allen's proposed revisions will eliminate
certain features of trials that are paradoxical by reference to both Pascalian
and Baconian models, it does not follow that the revised system will yield
rational judgments by reference to the criteria of either.
In short, when I read in the introduction to Professor Allen's paper that he
intended to offer a reconceptualization of trials, I thought he had in mind a
project like that which Professor Nesson 69 and Professor Tribe70 before him
undertook. That is, I expected him to elaborate a model of the trial which
attended to values other than rationality but-and this would have been the
advance over Nesson and Tribe-had a clear place in it for rational information processing of a Baconian or a Pascalian kind. Instead, more than any
other recent writer on this topic, Professor Allen is willing to let some formal
model of rational decisionmaking dominate our views of how trials should
69
70

Nesson, supra note 21.
Tribe, supra note 10.
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proceed. In his scheme the normativity of such models lies not in the extent
to which they are consistent with the law's rules about how decisionmaking
should proceed but in their postulated compliance with a barely argued first
premise that the civil law elevates rational, neutral decisionmaking above all
other values. But there is a circle here, for it is not at all clear how rational
decisionmaking proceeds. In suggesting that Pascalian and Baconian models, at least where their implications overlap, set a standard of rationality by
which the appropriateness of legal procedures may be judged, Professor
Allen elevates formal mathematical norms above legal ones. I, for one, am
troubled in a way that I71am not by efforts to formally model the rationality
that legal rules require.
Turning from Professor Allen's idea of what it means to reconceptualize
trials to his specific proposals for changes in how we should proceed, I find
yet more that troubles me. I alluded to some of these matters when I
discussed some values that Professor Allen's perspective ignores-for example, the social costs of discovery disputes and increased defense expenditures in cases that now end in directed verdicts at the close of the plaintiff's
case. Some of my other problems with Professor Allen's approach are even
more fundamental. For example, Professor Allen's suggestion that the trial
factfinder compare the probability of a fully specified plaintiff's case with
that of a fully specified defendant's case assumes that neither party has an
advantage in developing the facts of what occurred, and that the party who
can tell the most probable story deserves to win. This suggestion seems to
me to be either a prescription for what now occurs, including the possibility
of a negation defense, or a move likely to lead to substantial injustice.
Suppose a defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiff's case. He is asking the court to find that under no reasonable
reading of the evidence could a jury conclude that the plaintiff's claim is
more likely than not to be true. If the plaintiff's case is as weak as the
defendant claims, what can be gained from requiring the defendant to present a more plausible story than that implicit in his motion for a directed
verdict; i.e., the event had to have happened in some other way? Nothing, I
would argue.
If Professor Allen's proposal means that defendants would be required to
offer particularized counter-stories in such circumstances, costs would be
incurred. One, to which I have alluded, is the cost of forcing a defendant to
71 The difference lies in the implications of disjunctions between legal rules and
formal models. If the model is independently normative, inconsistent legal rules are
"wrong" and should be changed. If the law is normative, inconsistencies between
the law and a model reflect the model's inadequacy. If Professor Allen could show
that the law embodies some formal model of rationality as its primary norm, requiring

secondary procedural norms to conform to the model would not be problematic, for it
would be requiring them to conform to some higher legal norm. Professor Allen may

believe that this is the situation he is describing, but he has not established it
convincingly.
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mount an otherwise unnecessary defense. A second is the possibility that an
unjust decision will result because the defendant does not know how to
explain the phenomenon that the plaintiff seeks to hold him responsible for
and so cannot tell a particularized counter-story.
Consider, for example, a malpractice action brought by a plaintiff of age
ten against the doctor who delivered him. The claim is that a symptom-let
us say a tremor that began affecting the plaintiff's left arm at age nine-was
attributable to the way the doctor delivered him ten years before. The doctor
may have no recollection of the delivery, for the plaintiff's birth may have
been one of thousands of then unremarkable births the doctor aided, and the
doctor may have no clue as to what in fact causes the plaintiff's tremor.
Thus, all the doctor can say, unless perhaps he pays the costs of fully
diagnosing the plaintiff's condition, is that whatever the cause of the tremor
that emerged at age nine, it does not lie in an earlier unremarkable delivery.
Surely we do not wish to impose the costs of discovering the cause of the
plaintiff's condition on the defendant doctor. Not only may the cause be
ultimately undiscoverable but, even if it is potentially discoverable, it may
be unascertainable without the full cooperation of the plaintiff and his
family.
Professor Allen suggests that in some circumstances his preferred mode of
proceeding resembles the status quo. He writes, "A jury in evaluating
evidence should conclude that the probability of the defendant's versions of
reality is the probability of the plaintiff's versions subtracted from one only
if it feels that it has before it all relevant versions of reality. '7 2 To say that an
event happened in some way-that is in any possible way-other than as the
plaintiff claimed is to offer the jury all relevant versions of reality since the
plaintiff's claim and the defendant's negation exhaust the possible ways in
which the accident might have occurred. If this sort of negation is allowed,
then trials can proceed as they do now. If Professor Allen does not consider
general demurrers of this sort exhaustive of possible realities, injustice may
result when the plaintiff's claim is improbable, as in the malpractice example, but an innocent defendant cannot be expected to know much about what
really happened.
Now consider the situation where the plaintiff's case-in-chief is under the
current legal standard sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict.
Here the defendant fails to offer a counter-story at his peril. 73 Thus it is not
surprising that civil defendants, unlike criminal defendants who sometimes
are content to present no evidence and argue that the prosecution has not
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, invariably offer a defense when
confronted with a plaintiff's case sufficient to get to the jury. While we have
72
73

Allen, supra note 11, at 433.
Note that the counter-story need not involve presenting a case or even a

different version of the events. It may be simply a story, conveyed through cross-

examination, that the plaintiff's version of events is not to be believed.
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no systematic descriptions of what defense cases in civil trials typically
consist of, it is likely that they present story lines that conffict with plaintiffs'
stories.74 The conflicting story may be as simple as "the plaintiff's witnesses
cannot be believed" or as complex as is necessary to explain the plaintiff's
injury while negating any implication that the defendant is responsible.
Where a counter-story is offered, it is likely that factfinders decide by
evaluating the relative plausibility of the competing versions. This is precisely what Professor Allen would have them do.
But Professor Allen writes as if deciding in this way is inconsistent with a
system in which a "preponderance of the evidence" means "more likely
than not" in the sense conveyed when we say that to prevail the plaintiff
must show that there is at least a slightly better than .50 chance that his
version of reality is correct. Thus in Professor Allen's proposed scheme a
plaintiff who offered a story or stories that had a .40 chance of being true
would prevail over a defendant whose version or versions of what happened
had only a .30 chance of being right.
Again, however, I think we are misled because objective probabilities are
being used to analyze a situation in which the factfinder employs subjective
estimates. The factfinder is not asked to evaluate the true probability of the
plaintiff's case. Rather he or she must decide on the basis of the evidence in
the case whether the plaintiff's case is more likely than not-that is whether
it has a more than .50 chance-to be true. In most cases when a factfinder is
presented with a plaintiff's story that has a .40 chance of being true and a
defendant's story that has a .30 chance of being true, it can conclude that, on
the basis of the evidence before it, the plaintiff's story is more likely than
not-not simply more likely than the defendant's story-to be true. This is in
part because if none of the evidence presented suggests other explanations
for the incident which objectively has a, .30 chance of being true, probabilities evaluated on the basis of the extant evidence will subjectively sum
to more than .70-perhaps even to 1.0. The factfinder will not be conscious
of other possibilities and so will not accord them some probability.
Where the factfinder is aware of other possibilities a spoliation inference
may close an otherwise apparent gap. Assume, for example, that a plaintiff
presents a story that strikes the factfinder as having a .40 chance of accurately recounting what has happened. The defendant presents an exonerative story that the factfinder estimates as having a .30 chance of describing
what occurred. An additional exonerative possibility-also with an apparent
.30 probability of describing what has occurred-is obvious to the factfinder.
May the factfinder find that the plaintiff has proved his case by a preponderance of the evidence if this requires a rational conclusion that there is
" Cf. W.
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somewhat more than a .50 chance that the plaintiff's story is true? I think so.
The second exonerative possibility that was obvious to the factfinder should
have been obvious to the defendant as well. The defendant's failure to offer
evidence in support of this possibility suggests that the defendant, and
perhaps the plaintiff as well, knows from evidence not presented that this
apparently plausible theory is not supported by the facts. Thus, the factfinder may rationally rely on the spoliation inference and treat the case as if
there is a four in seven chance that the plaintiff's version is correct.
Where the spoliation inference is unreasonable given the evidence, and
the situation is as described above, 5 I believe that the preponderance of the
evidence standard should ordinarily and usually does require a verdict for
the defendant even though the plaintiff's story is more plausible than the
account the defendant explicitly offers. It is, however, difficult to imagine
such a situation, for in rebutting the spoliation inference, the defendant is, in
effect, advancing the second exonerative story. He is seeking to persuade
the factfinder that his failure to present more specific evidence in support of
a plausible exonerative story does not suggest that the story is untrue.
Specific supporting evidence is unavailable 6 for reasons that are neither
7
conditioned on the truth of the story nor within the defendant's control.
A related situation exists when the defendant's strategy is to destroy the

71 That is, the plaintiff presents an inculpatory story with a .40 chance of being
true; the defendant presents an exonerative story with a .30 chance of being true; and
there is an obvious second exonerative possibility with a .30 chance of being true that
is not rendered less plausible by the defendant's failure to support it with evidence.
76 If specific evidence supporting a third possibility or possibilities could be offered, the chances of the possibility should rise above the .30 probability that
Professor Allen hypothesizes. This is so because the law's factfinder is required to
decide cases on the evidence presented, evaluated in the light of common sense. If a
factfinder believes that there is an exonerative possibility not directly advanced and
only indirectly supported (i.e., not ruled out by the evidence offered) which has a .30
chance of being true, it is almost certain to accord the possibility a greater than .30
chance of being true if specific supporting evidence is offered.
71 An exception to the defendant's ability to take advantage of obvious exonerative
possiblities not belied by the spoliation inference exists when the spoliation inference
is untenable because some legal rule, e.g., a rule of privilege, prevents the defendant
from supporting the possibility. Here, even though the defendant's failure to offer
evidence does not give rise to the inference that the possibility does not in fact exist,
the factfinder ordinarily should not be able to consider the possibility in evaluating
the strength of the plaintiff's case. This is because the policy reasons that preclude
the defendant from offering the evidence usually preclude verdicts based on
assumptions-however plausible-of what the evidence would have contained.
Where they do not, as in jurisdictions that allow the invocation of privileges to be
mentioned in civil cases, the situation reverts to that described in the text. Where
policy reasons do preclude such assumptions, the state has decided to sacrifice
accurate verdicts to some officially more important value.
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plaintiff's case through cross-examination, and the defendant offers little or
nothing in the way of a case-in-chief. By Professor Allen's scheme it might
appear that in this situation the plaintiff should prevail, as even a highly
questionable story appears to outweigh no story at all. But our instincts tell
us this cannot be right. It is not right because in relying on cross-examination
the defendant is telling a story, and if the cross-examination is devastating
the defendant's story is more plausible than the plaintiff's. The defendant's
story is that the sequence of events resulting in injury did not occur in the
way it must have for legal liability to attach to the defendant. The sequence
has this appearance only because the plaintiff has found witnesses who are
poor observers, forgetful, or deceptive.
That the defendant cannot explain how the injury occurred does not
preclude a defense verdict. On the evidence before it the factfinder cannot conclude that it is more likely than not that the injury occurred in a
way that justifies a decision for the plaintiff. In attacking the plaintiff's case
through cross-examination, the defendant is suggesting numerous ways in
which the facts, if relayed by credible witnesses, might exonerate him. When
cross-examination has been artful, there may be no need for a defense
case-in-chief.
Thus, I disagree with Professor Allen's suggestion that defendants be
required to respond to plaintiffs assertions with "equally specific and
affirmative allegations rather than with simple denials." 78 I do not think
Professor Allen's proposed reformulation of the rules of proof, a proposal
rooted in his concern with the "negation problem," is workable in practice.
It imposes unnecessary costs on defendants and may lead to injustice when
either the factual situation or the rules of evidence are such that true defense
stories are difficult to establish. Nor do I find the suggestion conceptually
compelling. For the reasons I have just outlined, I don't think a negation
problem of the kind Professor Allen outlines exists in most cases. This is
because the factfinder must decide the case on the evidence before it,
which will ordinarily involve comparing plaintiff and defense stories in
such a way that the subjective probabilities of the plaintiff's and defendant's versions of events, taking into account spoliation inferences, will add
up to one. Where this is not the case, I think it is appropriate to require the
plaintiff to show that there is a better then .50 chance that he should
prevail.79 I see no good reason why the defendant should not be able to take
78
79

Allen, supra note 11, at 426.
I also believe it appropriate to place on plaintiffs the burden of showing that

there is a better than .50 chance that all legally necessary elements exist. While
Professor Allen's suggestion that juries compare two fully specified versions of
reality may eliminate the conjunction paradox, id. at 427, to the extent this is a
problem, I believe the suggested solution's costs are too high. For example, the
suggestion would apparently allow a tort plaintiff to escape a directed verdict at the
close of his case even though he presents no evidence tending to establish the
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advantage both of weaknesses in the plaintiff's case and of the factfinder's
common-sense ability to spot theories specifically offered by neither party
but rationally based on the evidence.80 In the long run I think that justice in
the sense of accurate verdicts will be enhanced. This may in part reflect my
feeling that the paradoxes that Professor Allen and others pose are not as
serious as some think, and my belief that even if they pose conceptual
problems this does not mean that the rules currently regulating trial proof
make the trial an irrational fact-finding institution.
defendant's fault. Moreover, if the defendant presents no evidence that he was not at
fault Professor Allen would apparently let the case get to the jury at the close of all
the evidence, for his view appears to be that if the parties do not wish to explore some
feature of the case in great depth a court should not force them to do so. Id. at 428.
This suggestion is troublesome for a variety of reasons. The first, to which I have
alluded, is the cost of forcing the defendant to mount a defense when the plaintiff has
no case. A second is that the argument assumes that proof is equally accessible to
both parties. It may be harder for the defendant to prove a negative-absence of
fault-than it is for a plaintiff to prove a positive violation of some duty of care.
Third, to the extent that the rule leads to recovery where defendants are not at fault,
social resources would, at least in theory, be misallocated as certain potentially
careless activities bear more than their share of the costs they generate. Fourth, to
change the rule as Professor Allen proposes would negate the evidentiary value of the
spoliation inference and perhaps reduce confidence in judgments. Currently, if a
plaintiff presents no evidence of fault in his case-in-chief, we can be confident that a
directed verdict is just because the burden placed on plaintiffs means that if evidence
of the defendant's fault were available, the plaintiff would surely have presented it.
Under Professor Allen's proposed scheme, the plaintiff's (or the defendant's) failure
to present evidence on a hitherto legally necessary element of the plaintiff's case
would justify only a lesser inference of nonexistence since the evidence might be
withheld-perhaps knowing the other side could offer nothing on the point as wellfor tactical reasons. Finally, Professor Allen's scheme neglects certain symbolic and
other hard to quantify values. The adversary system is not the law's highest value.
We may not wish our legal system to allow parties to recover in negligence without
evidence of defendant's fault even if both parties are willing to let the case go to the
jury in this posture. The system does not exist to take cognizance of all disputes or to
resolve all cases on the grounds the parties prefer.
The example of parties who in developing their specific stories choose not to
present evidence of fault in a negligence case is an extreme example chosen to make a
point. But I think many of the same arguments apply in other cases, such as Professor
Allen's example of the case where the parties both choose to rely on relatively crude
statistical data. Id. The issue is not just whether the parties should be allowed
to choose what evidence to present as Professor Allen suggests. Rather, given a
variety of policy reasons like those sketched above, the issue is what should be the
consequence of a party's choice when the other side moves for a directed verdict. I
don't see the adoption of Professor Allen's suggestions as improving the current
rules.
10 Note that this latter possibility is symmetrical. Common-sense theories not
specifically advanced may fill what would otherwise be gaps in the plaintiff's case.
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In sum, I do not think that Professor Allen offers us a theoretically or
practically useful reconceptualization of trials. Nevertheless, I admire Professor Allen's article for the creativity that underlies some of his most
controversial claims. His novel positions make his effort an interesting and
stimulating piece of work. In this respect Professor Allen's article illustrates
the virtues of the new evidence scholarship, for it suggests the controversy
and intellectual excitement that are likely to accompany the move from a
concern for rules to a concern for proof.

